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Self-Reflection within the Academy: The Absence 
of Women in Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Karin Mika* 
One does not have to be an ardent feminist to recognize that the con-
tributions of women in our society have been largely unacknowledged by 
both history and education. l Individuals need only be reasonably attentive 
to recognize there is a similar absence of women within the curriculum 
presented in a standard legal education. If one reads Elise Boulding's The 
Underside of History2 it is readily apparent that there are historical links 
between the achievements of women and Nineteenth century labor reform, 
Abolitionism, the Suffrage Movement and the contemporary view as to 
what should be protected First Amendment speech? Despite Boulding's 
depiction, treatises and texts on both American Legal History-and those 
tracing the development of Constitutional Law-present these topics as 
distinct and without any significant intersection.4 The contributions of 
women within all of these movements, except perhaps for the rarely men-
*Assistant Director, Legal Writing Research and Advocacy Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law. J.D., 1989, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Thanks to Jerry Chattman and Ar-
thur Landever for their inspiration and input. Special thanks to my research assistant, Amy 
Hull. 
1. See Richard P Morin, 'I looked for girls . .. who faced the world without timidity', 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, April 13, 1997, at B11 (Voices of New England) (edited conversation 
between Kathleen Odean and Correspondent Richard P. Morin). Odean, a school librarian, 
attempted to compile a list of children's books in which women were portrayed as "creative, 
capable, articulate, and intelligent." Id. She discovered that there were far more books 
portraying positive role models for boys than girls but did come up with 600 books that 
portrayed positive role models for females. Id. Despite this, Odean claims that, "School 
children read six times more biographies of men than women." Id. at B12. 
2. ELISE BOULDING, THE UNDERSIDE OF HISTORY (1976). 
3. See id. at 635-83. See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal 
of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 653 (1988). 
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAlNALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1995). Presser and Zainaldin's text 
was modified from its first edition to include a section on "Women and the Family." The 
section includes the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments and an essay by Sarah Grirnke, 
but these two documents (and discussion questions) only take up approximately ten pages. 
Id. at 545-53. 
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tioned Suffrage Movement, are largely ignored.5 
Historian Gerda Lerner has posed the question: "Are women notewor-
thy when their achievement falls exactly in a category of achievement set 
up for men?,,6 The poignant but self-evident answer is, "Obviously not ... 
. ,,7 If women were deemed worthy of mention, the names of Myra Brad-
well, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Mary Harris "Mother" Jones would be as 
familiar to graduating law students as those of Clarence Darrow, Thurgood 
Marshall or Eugene V. Debs. We would also know of Harriet Scott, Mrs. 
Dred Scott, who filed her own suit for personal freedom, went virtually 
unacknowledged by the Supreme Court and has gone equally unacknow-
ledged by posterity. 8 If there were any equality of recognition, what we 
view as American legal traditions would involve a study of the important 
contributions of famous females, and this study would not be limited to, or 
segregated within, specialized or obscure programs. 
This article will suggest that legal education has failed to represent the 
significant contributions of women in our American legal heritage within 
its curriculum. It urges that an acknowledgment of the feminine contribu-
tion must now be included within the curriculum of law schools in such a 
way that the contribution is incorporated within traditional substantive 
courses rather than select courses dealing with primarily "women's is-
sues." Focusing on the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, this ar-
ticle highlights the achievements and legal battles of women which were 
integral to the overall development of legal theory in our country. It dis-
cusses some of the history that has been left out, offers various reasons 
why such history has been left out and suggest reasons for its inclusion. 
The article also considers the perpetuated stereotypes of women's roles 
5. In fact, a reading of almost any textbook used in our core curriculum classes today 
would make it appear that women have had little involvement in the development of the 
law. Such textbooks might give the appearance that the only involvement women had with 
the development of law in this country was their vindication via Married Women's Property 
Acts or other protectionist legislation. Generally these reforms are discussed from an ab-
stract perspective of a law simply being created, as opposed to whether any political move-
ment initiated by discontented women brought about the change. See, e.g., RICHARD B. 
MORRIS PH.D, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 173-84 (1930). Even the Suf-
frage Movement, if mentioned at all, is more often than not treated as isolated from the re-
mainder of legal history and the development of constitutional theory. Usually, the Suffrage 
Movement is associated with married women's property laws (within legal history texts). 
There seems to be an intimation that suffrage was solely a response to that particular disen-
franchisement. See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 264-67 (2d ed. 1996) (This book includes the Seneca Falls Declaration of Sen-
timents and is followed by the New York Women's Married Property Acts.). See also 
PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 4, at 500-50. 
6. GERDA LERNER, THE MAJORITY FINDS ITS PAST: PLACING WOMEN IN HISTORY 13 
(1979). 
7. Id. 
8. See generally Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE 
LJ. 1033 (1997). 
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during the previous century. It will point out various instances in which 
male efforts to "protect" women resulted in oppression rather than benefit 
and, in doing so, set the stage for a male-constructed and male-dominated 
legal system. This article suggests that this system resulted in the triviali-
zation of females' roles within American legal history, and correspond-
ingly, within American legal education. It is this author's contention that 
to allow this perpetuation in legal education is not only doing a disservice 
to female students, but is an inaccurate portrayal of history, which harms 
all students and diminishes the integrity of legal education. 
"VOICES LOST IN THE CHASM SPEAK FROM THE SLOW ELOQUENT FACT OF 
THE CHASM,,9: THE END OF THE COLONIAL ERA AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE FACTORY 
It has never been the case that women were absent when matters of 
historical significance occurred. Women have been "somewhere"l0 but 
have generally been treated as if they were invisible because they fell out-
side the power structure. 11 The true history of both the working woman 
and the professional woman in this country is not one that might be re-
garded as astonishing. 12 Yet it is not one that is well-known by either men 
or women. Since most modem historical teaching seems predicated on the 
theory that, for hundreds of years, women were involuntarily confined to 
the domestic sphere, there has been virtually no recognition that many of 
these "oppressed" women have made their distinctive mark upon history.13 
While some of the stereotypes about societal attitudes during the Co-
lonial era in the United States are certainly true, these attitudes initially 
were not so engraved as we now perceive them to have been. 14 Early set-
tlements depended upon the work of women both in and out of the home. 15 
Because the male "sphere" at the time was often "in the field," a woman's 
job was not restricted to raising children and performing domestic chores. 16 
Perhaps out of necessity rather than equality, women in America during 
both the 1600s and 1700s did everything that someone else was not already 
9. P A TRlCIA 1. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 201 (1991). 
10. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987) ("Women have a his-
tory all right, but it is a history both of what was and of what was not allowed to be."). 
11. "At best their relationship to power was implicit and peripheral and could easily be 
passed over as insignificant." LERNER, supra note 6, at 3. 
12. Ruth Ashby writes, "Of course, women have always been in actual history-the pro-
gress of human events-as opposed to official history." HERSTORY: WOMEN WHO 
CHANGED THE WORLD xiv (Ruth Ashby & Deborah Gore Ohm eds., 1995) [hereinafter 
HERSTORY]. 
13. See id. at 16-17. 
14. See Elizabeth Dexter, Colonial Women of Affairs, in AMERICA THROUGH WOMEN'S 
EYES 21 (Mary R. Beard 1933). 
15. See HERSTORY, supra note 12, at 16-17. 
16. !d. 
j9 
-
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doing. I7 This included entering professional trades, such as practicing law 
and medicine, which required no professional schooling for certification. 18 
This is not to say, of course, that there were not traditional prohibitions 
upon women within the work force; however, there was more flexibility 
because the law had yet to inscribe its prejudices on the whole of society. 19 
As the country became more developed economically and industrially 
during the late 1700s and early 1800s, the European view of "the genteel 
lady of fashion,,2o became the model of American femininity.21 Gender 
divisions of labor became much more traditional. Corresponding to this 
shift was the development of a wholesale societal attitude that fostered 
both legal and social discrimination against women. Women were legisla-
tively prohibited from voting and, often, even when married, from owning 
property.22 Women were socially excluded from "male" activities by being 
barred from colleges and ostracized from the medical and legal fields. 23 
The exclusion of women from higher education and "trades" created a 
societal challenge. Young women, who were expected to find mates, had 
no means of support?4 These women were often viewed as burdens to 
17. In fact, because John Adams spent most of his time engaged in politics, Abigail Ad-
ams became responsible for running the household, including all financial matters. She had 
to watch over lands owned by John and make numerous investment decisions. Although 
technically Abigail Adams had no civil existence, she was able to overcome this by demon-
strating proficiency at these tasks and gaining the respect of those doing business with her. 
See CHARLES W. AKERS, ABIGAIL ADAMS: AN AMERICAN WOMAN 68-69 (1980). 
18. See Sophie H. Drinker, Women Attorneys of Colonial Times, 57 MD. HIST. MAG. 
335-51 (Dec. 1961). 
19. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 16-20. 
20. [d. at 18. 
21. Bernhard J. Stern has commented: 
Whatever distinctive characteristics the American family assumed were de-
rived from the fact that the frontier areas of the United States were settled by 
individual families rather than by groups as in the agricultural villages of 
Europe. Their relative isolation tended to develop, therefore, a pronounced 
functional ingrown economic and affectional pattern. In the United States, 
moreover, diverse family forms were constantly being brought to these 
shores by different immigrant groups. These persisted as long as ethnic 
communities retained their strength but gave way, as their communities gave 
way, to the standardizing effects of industrial society. 
Bernhard J. Stern, The Family and Cultural Change, in WOMAN IN A MAN-MADE WORLD, 
13, 15 (Nona Galzer-Malbin & Helen Youngelson Waehrer eds., 1972). 
22. See Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 383, 
385-90 (1994). 
23. Licensing criteria was set up in some states for doctors and attorneys. Within the li-
censing requirement was the need to attend an approved school, or at least the strong en-
couragement that aspiring professionals do so. Most of these schools would not admit 
women. As a consequence, women could not complete the preferred program for certifica-
tion and were squeezed out of the profession by males who were seeking the professional 
schooling. See AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVES 566 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988). 
24. See N.E.H. HULL, FEMALE FELONS: WOMEN AND SERIOUS CRIME IN COLONIAL 
MASSACHUSETTS 54 (1987); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN 
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their families and to the whole of society.25 Soon after industrialization 
began in North America these women (and later women with small chil-
dren) were encouraged to take on factory jobs?6 Since the work was be-
lieved to be simply an extension of what the women would otherwise do at 
home, the factory was said to offer the ultimate benefit-a ready means of 
supplementing family income and of providing subsistence for unmarried 
daughters. 27 
Admittedly, the earliest factories in the United States were intended to 
be set-up much differently from those existing in Europe, known univer-
sally for their oppression and abhorrent working conditions.28 One of the 
first (and perhaps most notable) factories set-up with this "softer" ap-
proach to treating its workers was the Lowell Textile Factory of Lowell, 
Massachusetts, established in 1823.29 The Lowell Factory was staffed with 
all women who stayed in boarding houses.3o Chaperons, or "matrons," 
were on hand to ensure that the women did not fall victim to any type of 
"vice.,,31 By being housed in an all-female community, the women were 
able to establish social relationships and share ideas. The factory owners 
additionally provided a library and on-site lecturers so that their "genteel" 
ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 179 (1977). 
25. See PAT JALLAND, WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND POLITICS 1860-1914, at 253 (1986). 
26. The contemporary view was that factory jobs would give the women a sense of 
"accomplishment." See generally Edith Abbott, Women in Industry, in AMERICA THROUGH 
WOMEN'S EYES 127, 129 (Mary R. Beard ed., 1933). 
Another point of interest in connection with the employment of women in 
the early mills and factories is that their work in these establishments was 
approved on social as well as on economic grounds. . . . [I]n the colonial 
period great apprehension existed lest women and children, particularly 
those who were poor and in danger of becoming a public charge, should fall 
into the sin of idleness. 
Id. at 132. 
27. Those with children were encouraged to bring them along. "The more children a 
family had, the more eagerly they were sought by the factory, for they provided a constant 
supply of cheap labor." THE FACTORY GIRLS xv (Philip S. Foner, ed. 1977) [hereinafter 
FACTORY GIRLS]. The children could work in the factories and "be a benefit to society" 
rather than remaining idle or being a burden to society. Id. 
28. Originally it was believed that industrial development should remain in Europe and 
that agriCUlture would sustain the United States; however, when the profitability of the fac-
tory-system was recognized, some of the nation's leaders (such as Thomas Jefferson) 
changed their view. See id. at xiv-xvii. The system was to be set up differently than the 
British system in order to avoid the creation of a pauperized underclass. See id. Entrepre-
neurs, such as Francis Cabot Lowell, toured Britain in order to figure out how better to in-
dustrialize the United States. See id. Lowell is credited with initiating the "Waltham ex-
periment" (named after a factory in Waltham, Massachusetts) which dealt more with 
machinery logistics than how the employees would be treated. See id. As part of the factory 
systerr.., Lowell and his colleagues determined that the female employees would be housed 
in dorms, supervised and obligated to attend religious instruction. See id. 
29. For a history of the New England mills, see generally HANNAH JOSEPHSON, THE 
GoLDEN THREADS: NEW ENGLAND'S MILL GIRLS AND MAGNATES (1949). 
30. Id. at 52-72. 
31. FACTORY GIRLS, supra note 27, at xvii. 
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workers could better themselves. 32 The designers of the Lowell Factory 
system believed that this community aspect distinguished their factory 
from the oppressive European systems.33 Lowell women could engage in a 
meaningful occupation, help their families, live in a friendly environment 
and participate in "virtuous" pastimes (such as reading and attending lec-
tures)-all with pay.34 
Lowell and similarly set-up factories were idyllic at first, but over time 
the situation changed.35 As the United States became more industrial than 
agrarian, there was increased economic competition both within the coun-
try and with Europe. 36 Factory owners endeavored to make their factories 
more profitable and often did so at the expense of their workers. 37 The 
workers began to resent the factory conditions, complained, organized and 
engaged in various work slowdowns and strikes to get their point across.38 
Eventually, the women at Lowell and the other female-staffed factories 
won the fight for a ten hour workday and several other concessions related 
to assigned duties and divisions of labor. 39 
LOWELL'S ABSENCE IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Although neither the Lowell factory workers nor other female work 
forces changed the industrial world, their existence should not have fallen 
into a historical void. There are several reasons why Lowell, and the 
similarly situated female-staffed factories, should be acknowledged. In the 
first place, the actions of the female operatives were ones that predated 
most of the major labor struggles that are now regarded as noteworthy 
within the development of this country's labor law.40 Secondly, the his-
torical context of the struggle is significant. In viewing the actions of the 
female factory workers, it should be kept in mind that, at the time, women 
32. [d. at xix. Mill operative Lucy Larcom stated, "We had all been fairly educated at 
public or private schools, and many of us were resolutely bent upon obtaining a better edu-
cation." Lucy LARCOM, A NEW ENGLAND GIRLHOOD 142 (1889). Larcom eventually 
graduated from Monticello Female Seminary and became editor of the Boston magazine 
"Our Young Folks." [d. at 20 
33. FACTORY GIRLS, supra note 27, at xiv-xvii. 
34. See id. at xvii. 
35. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 29, at 74. 
36. See generally FACTORY GIRLS, supra note 27, at 57-156. 
37. See id. 
38. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 29, at 225. 
39. See id. 
40. In defense of the chroniclers of history, the Lowell women were certainly not the first 
to complain about working conditions. They were not the first to organize in an effort to 
improve such conditions. Trade and craft unions in predominantly male work forces began 
springing up near the end of the Eighteenth century. No doubt the nature of the times influ-
enced the female workers to seek better conditions as opposed to some novel theory of 
equality or heightened sense of self-determination. See id. at 228-29. 
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were near the bottom of the list of the disenfranchised and the powerless.41 
The workers could not proceed through "appropriate administrative chan-
nels.,,42 Nor could the women leave a bad employment situation to pursue 
another meaningful trade.43 Worse yet, the female factory workers were 
actually condemned for complaining about their working conditions, la-
beled "overly aggressive," "ungrateful" and "unladylike" by both men and 
even demure women co-workers.44 
Despite having no true power and little expectation of success, the 
women did organize and protest.45 Although the women may not have 
seen their mission as anything other than to improve their own situations, 
their struggle is still significant. It presents a different perspective on how 
and why labor unions began in this country. An incorporation of the fe-
male factory situations in legal study would demonstrate that the formation 
of labor unions has not always been about men organizing, and that labor 
legislation has not always been about protecting women who could not or 
did not assert their rights. The Lowell efforts are no less important to the 
development of labor unions in this country than are the efforts of their 
male counterparts; yet it is the relationship of women to the labor move-
ment in this country that has been marginalized. That is precisely the 
problem with their exclusion from legal history. The activities were the 
same, but history, including legal history, has treated men's labor struggles 
as revolutionizing employment standards and facilitating the genesis of la-
bor law while simply ignoring the contributions of women. 
A MORE DELICATE ORGANISM: SUPREME COURT VIEWS ON WORKING 
WOMEN 
During the latter portion of the Nineteenth century, a number of states 
enacted legislation limiting the hours women could work. 46 While some 
viewed this as a feminist victory, others saw the legislation as more of the 
same oppressive paternalism that prevented women from making their own 
choices.47 The laws wound up being challenged and defended by many 
41. See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of 
Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151, 153 (David Kairys ed., rev. 
ed. 1990). 
42. [d. 
43. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 29, at 221-27. 
44. [d. Each woman, regardless of intellect, was relegated to the one-size-fits-all status 
of not only being proficient at domestic chores and child-rearing, but somehow believing it 
was their sacred duty to want no more. 
45. FACTORY GIRLS, supra note 27, at 9-10. 
46. States included Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New York, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417, 419 n.1 (1908). 
47. See generally Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1988). 
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individuals who were theoretically on the same side of the women's rights 
• 48 Issue. 
United States Supreme Court decisions regarding women's issues 
during this era are a composite of some truthful perceptions, standard 
constitutional jurisprudence of the time and a fair amount of stereotyping.49 
There are also noticeable inconsistencies on the part of the Court as it 
viewed general labor constraints versus "female" labor constraints. 50 
After ushering in the Lochner51 era with a decision invalidating an 
overall statutory limitation on the workday, the Supreme Court dealt with 
similar labor issues specific to women. 52 Where women were concerned, 
the Supreme Court upheld statutes limiting the number of hours that could 
be worked and the times of day during which "women's work" could take 
place.53 The Court did so primarily on a "state's prerogative" basis but 
additionally relied on broad descriptions of female "physical delicacies" in 
This author has often had conversations with individuals who have made the argument that 
women want it both ways; they want protection where they feel like it and equality where 
they feel like it. The limitation on hours is singled out as proof for that premise. Admit-
tedly it was not a bad thing for legislatures to limit the working hours of women, and admit-
tedly, that legislation was prompted by female groups and heralded as a success in the 
struggle for women's rights. However, the situation is not all it appears to be. In the first 
place, as this paper presents, it would have been a good thing to limit both the male and fe-
male workday, not just the females'. Females just happened to be the beneficiaries at the 
time. Secondly, the plight of the female that necessitated intervention was the direct result 
of oppression. Had men and women started on an equal societal footing in this country, 
some factory owners could have been women and the course of labor law would likely have 
been much different. Labor legislation might very well have been equal with respect to 
what benefits were provided to both men and women. There is a similar parallel with the 
plight of the Native American. There are currently many complained-about legislative pref-
erences; these, however, are the end result of poor past legislation that attempted to do what 
the government thought was best for Native Americans. Since Native Americans were 
never part of their own societal self-determination, they, as well as the federal government, 
are left in a situation where neither legislation nor lack of legislation will remedy what has 
happened. See Patrick Clarke, Tribal Affiliation Based Employment Preferences: Is this an 
Allowable Practice Under Title VII's Indian Preference Provisions?, 20 T. MARSHALL L. 
REv. 291, 292-93 (1995). 
48. See LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 164-65 (1983). It was Louis Brandeis who defended 
the challenge to the constitutionality of laws limiting the working hours for women. Bran-
deis, at the time, was a civil liberties lawyer whose talents were solicited by Josephine 
Goldmark (his sister-in-law) and Florence Kelley of the National Consumers League. 
Brandeis was a sympathizer of unions and had hoped to limit working hours in general; 
however, he focused on establishing the validity of the laws protecting females. As his 
strategy, he emphasized the delicacy of the female. This was a strategy approved of by both 
Goldmark and Kelley. See id. 
49. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text. 
50. See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
51. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Note that Justices Harlan, White, Day 
and Holmes dissented from this opinion and that Justice Holmes wrote a separate dissent.). 
52. Mark G. Yadof, 1990 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: The Federal Courts and 
the Constitution, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1400-07 (1990). 
53. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
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order to justify the need for such statutes.54 Most notably, in Muller v. 
Oregon,55 Justice Brewer commented 
[t]hat woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal 
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsis-
tence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of 
motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant 
testimony of the medical fraternity, continuance for a long time on 
her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious 
effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers are essential to vig-
orous offspring, the physical well-being of women becomes an 
object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength 
and vigor of the race .... Differentiated by these matters from the 
other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legisla-
tion designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like 
legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. It 
is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to 
her brother and depends on him. 56 
In Radice v. New York,57 the Court was confronted with a constitu-
tional challenge to a statute that prohibited women from working between 
the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Justice Sutherland, writing for the major-
ity, justified that statute by stating: 
The legislature had before it a mass of information from which it 
concluded that night work is substantially and especially detrimen-
tal to the health of women. We cannot say that the conclusion is 
without warrant. The loss of restful night's sleep cannot be fully 
made up by sleep in the day time, especially in busy cities, subject 
to the disturbances incident to modem life. The injurious conse-
quences were thought by the legislature to bear more heavily 
against women than men, and, considering their more delicate or-
ganism, there would seem to be good reason for so thinking.58 
Intrestingly, a year earlier, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,59 Justice 
Sutherland declared that upholding a minimum wage statute would 
ignore all the implications to be drawn from the present day trend 
of legislation, as well as that of common thought and usage, by 
which woman is accorded emancipation from the old doctrine that 
54. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140 (1872) (Bradley J., concurring). 
55. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
56. [d. at 422. 
57. 264 U.S. 292 (1924). 
58. Id. at 294. 
59. 261 U.S. 525, 553 (1923). 
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she must be given special protection or be subjected to special re-
straint in her contractual and civil relationships.60 
He also stated that the inequality between the sexes "have now come al-
most, if not quite, to the vanishing point.,,61 
While on the surface there is seemingly no rational justification for the 
contradiction, it might very well be that the distinction is one in which 
there was a perceived need for physical protection but not necessarily a 
perceived need for decision-making protection. There was likely no con-
tradiction in Justice Sutherland's mind because he was taking into consid-
eration what he viewed as physical realities. Although some of the Su-
preme Court's assessments are accurate (women bear children and are 
generally smaller in size than men), one wonders whether it might not have 
been better if the Court had simply declared that it was in the interest of 
the health and well-being of the citizenry in general to place limitations 
upon everyone's workday. Aside from this approach, the Court could have 
tempered its commentary regarding the extreme delicacies of women so 
that it did not appear that most women were nearly invalids. 
United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has stated, 
"By enshrining and promoting the woman's 'natural' role as homemaker, 
and correspondingly emphasizing the man's role as provider, the state im-
peded both men and women from pursuit of the very opportunities that 
would have enabled them to break away from familiar stereotypes.,,62 
Rather than acknowledge that poor factory conditions and long working 
hours might have deleterious effects on any individual subjected to them, 
the Supreme Court continued to reinforce and perpetuate many stereotypes 
about women.63 True, in Bunting v. Oregon,64 decided nine years after 
Muller, the Supreme Court upheld an hours restriction for male factory 
workers. The Court did not, however, include an elaborate discussion on 
the potential detrimental health effects of lengthy hours. 
Unfortunately, it has been the female "frailty" descriptions that history 
has accorded the most credibility.65 These stereotypes continue to be ac-
cepted within our society.66 Perhaps it is even fair to say that some of 
60. [d. 
61. [d. 
62. The Honorable Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women Becoming Part of the 
Constitution, 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 17,21 (1988). 
63. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
64. 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
65. See generally Katherine C. Sheehan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Doubt, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN'S LJ. 201 (1997). 
66. See WINNIE HAZOU, THE SOCIAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 13 (1990). 
The caste-like status differentiation has become normal and accepted by all, 
even the less-privileged sex. Women have been socialized into believing in 
their inferiority of endowment; they accept a special woman's sphere which 
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these stereotypes have been internalized by women as a class~ even though 
modern society regards women on a more equal intellectual and legal 
plane, many women still do not believe it, or believe that there exists an 
exclusively feminine realm comprised of domesticity. 67 An example of 
this attitude manifesting itself might be Marilyn Quayle's comment, 
"Women do not wish to be liberated from their essential natures as 
women. ,,68 Although Ms. Quayle took substantial abuse for her statement, 
no doubt she spoke for a great many women.69 
"PEOPLE CALL ME A FEMINIST WHENEVER I EXPRESS SENTIMENTS THAT 
DIFFERENTIATE ME FROM A DOORMAT OR A PROSTITUTE,,70: 
TRAILBLAZERS IN WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
Despite the societal perpetuation of stereotypical realms and behavior, 
certainly not all women would allow the "delicacy" of their constitutions 
to hinder their pursuits.71 For example, Abigail Adams, without any for-
mal education, distinguished herself as the intellectual equal, if not advi-
sor, to her husband, John.72 During her life she wrote several thousand 
letters to both men and women. In these letters she discussed freely her 
perspectives on women's issues, child rearing, appropriate structures of 
government and even foreign policy.73 It is evident that the men who an-
swered these letters did not find Abigail Adams frivolous or of such an in-
is ascribed at birth, and they do not generally question their unequal status. 
Id. 
67. See generally SIMONE DE BOUVIER, THE SECOND SEX (1961). 
68. Karen Ball, Hillary Clinton Returns Fire After GOP Blasts, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
COURIER-J, (Lousiville KY.) Aug. 25, 1992, at 3A. 
69. Leo Kanowitz has commented upon this internalization of a seeming inferiority. 
Kanowitz states: 
With the exception of an intellectual elite or those who have inherited or re-
tained the feminist tradition, most American women do not appear to be 
greatly exercised by the persistence of inequities in their legal status .... 
[An] ... explanation may lie in the nature of the laws that discriminate on 
the basis of sex. Though legal rules often discriminate between the sexes, 
they do not always favor men over women. In certain areas, women appear 
to be the beneficiaries rather than the victims of the law's discrimination .... 
Fear of losing these and other legal "protections" as the quid pro quo for 
achieving full legal equality may also partly explain the decline of women's 
concern with their legal status since the adoption of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment. 
LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 2-3 (1969). 
70. Rebecca West, in THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 212 (John Daintith 
& Hazel Egerton eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
71. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. 
72. See AKERS, supra note 17, at 8-15. Although Abigail Adams proclaimed herself to 
be of a "delicate nature," this did not stop her lifelong dedication to learning, nor did she 
ever doubt that women should be educated and encouraged to better themselves by educa-
tion. 
73. See id. 
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tellectual inferiority that she was any less of a peer.74 There were others, 
Mercy Otis Warren, Margaret Fuller and Catherine Beecher-seemingly 
constrained by the time period in which they lived, yet each with as force-
ful a personality in history as her male peers.75 
Who were these females who ignored their perceived role in society 
and trailblazed despite overwhelming odds? How did they get the way 
they were? Conjecture would be interesting at this point. It could be hy-
pothesized that these "trailblazers" were exposed to political ideals through 
higher education in private boarding schools or private tutoring.76 There 
are other hypothetical generalizations-being exposed to European social-
ism, haling from a family with liberal, tolerant males or having an 
"intellectual" social climate within their community.77 It has also been 
suggested (primarily by men, of course) that the over-aggressiveness of 
these women had nothing to do with environment. Rather, the attitude was 
attributable to compensating for sexual dissatisfaction, perhaps not being 
able to get or keep a man or perhaps not caring for men at all.78 Mary 
Wollstonecraft, who is more closely associated with being Mary Shelley's 
mother than she is with her 1792 novel A Vindication of the Rights of 
Women, was openly labeled a "man hater" with "penis envy.,,79 
The inevitable finding is that there is not any single unifying personal 
characteristic that made a woman more or less likely to be interested in 
what were traditionally regarded as within a man's realm of thought or ac-
tion. Female villains and heroes, activists and nonactivists emerged, much 
like their male counterparts, sometimes from their backgrounds, sometimes 
from their education, sometimes from their life's experiences and some-
times simply from being in the right place at the right time. However, the 
problem today is that their existence is rarely acknowledged. With the 
handful that are recognized, their study often concentrates on the psychol-
ogy of their identity as opposed to their achievements or influences on 
I . 80 genera socIety. 
74. In fact, many believed Abigail could have prevented some poor political decisions on 
her husband's part had she been consulted. See id. at 161. 
75. See ANNE FlROR SCOTI & ANDREW MACKAY SCOTI, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE 
FIGHT FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE 7 (1982). 
76. There simply were not many places for females to gain a formal education. Oberlin 
College opened to women in 1833, with a few following in the middle Nineteenth century. 
Wellesley, Smith, Spelman, Bryn Mawr, Randolph-Macon, and Barnard did not open until 
after 1875. See Linda K. Kerber, The Unfinished Work of Alice Mary Baldwin, in VISffiLE 
WOMEN 352-53 (Nancy A. Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock eds., 1993). 
77. See generally BOULDING, supra note 2, at 617 -50. 
78. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
79. Miriam Brody Krarnnick, Introduction to MARY WOLLSTONECRAFf, A VINDICATION 
OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 7 (Miriam Krarnnick ed., Penguin Classics 1975) (1872) (quoting 
newspaper articles written at the time the book was released). 
80. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 14-20. 
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"No ONE KNOWS ANY MORE OF WHAT LIES BEYOND OUR SPHERE OF 
ACTION, THAN YOU AND I; AND WE KNOW NOTHING,,81: THE WOMEN'S 
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 
The Women's Suffrage Movement crossed more class, social and legal 
boundaries than did any other social movement in the United States.82 It 
was responsible for laws made and laws rejected. It intersected with the 
enactments of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution and spanned a time period from approxi-
mately 1839 until 1920.83 Yet even a mention of its existence is virtually 
absent from law school curriculum. Indeed, even courses in American le-
gal history give it scant attention. 
The Suffrage Movement, contrary to popular myth, did not spring up 
in isolation at the onset of the Twentieth century or as a byproduct of the 
roaring twenties. 84 The Movement was a true movement-the end result of 
an amalgamation of other Nineteenth century movements that ended in 
what seemed to be the most appropriate response to what women deemed 
to be their oppressed lot. 85 The discontent of women stemmed from a va-
riety of factors-mistreatment in the factories, preclusion from educational 
opportunities and an inability for women to gain entitlement to an identity 
equal to, or even separate from, their male counterparts.86 
The Suffrage Movement did not have to wind up as the Suffrage 
Movement. It could just have likely wound up as the Women's Social 
Equality Movement, or even the Women's Movement for Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities. 87 No one really started out as a "Suffragette," nor 
was voting the female activists' initial interest. Lucretia Mott, one of the 
recognized founders of the Suffragette Movement, was a Philadelphia 
Quaker preacher interested in temperance and in ending slavery. 88 Others, 
81. 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 422 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881) (from 
the eulogy of Lucretia Mott). 
82. See generally SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 75. 
83. THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1-48 (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 
1978) [hereinafter CONCISE HISTORY]. 
84. "Suffragism has not been accorded the historic recognition it deserves, largely be-
cause woman suffrage has too frequently been regarded as an isolated institutional reform." 
ELLEN CAROL DuBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT 
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, at 17 (1978). 
85. See id. at 17-18. 
86. See id. at 18. Married women had no freedom to contract, and unmarried women 
were relegated to an almost worse fate by not being afforded opportunities to provide for 
themselves. Married women, for all intents and purposes, became synonymous with their 
mates and unmarried women were indoctrinated into a society that expected them to find 
mates. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 49. 
87. See generally DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 15-52. 
88. See LOIS W. BANNER, ELIZABETII CADY STANTON: A RADICAL FOR WOMAN'S RIGHTS 
24 (1980). 
M 
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such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton89 and Susan B. Anthony,90 began their in-
volvement as abolitionists. Some, such as Lucy Stone and Antoinette 
Brown, were exposed to inequities between males and females while in 
college.91 Victoria Woodhull (who, with Frederick Douglass, was nomi-
nated to run for president by the Equal Rights Party) was a woman who 
simply did not want to be limited by the conventions of the times. 92 
Doubtless, all eventual "Suffragettes" were bright, articulate women 
who found a kinship with one another in recognizing that they wanted 
something more in life than what society would allow them. However, 
there were divergent priorities even among these women. Many believed 
that acquiring voting rights would not achieve any level of equality with 
men (which was true on many levels) and so they focused on other re-
forms. 93 Writer Charlotte Perkins Gilman, discussing women and econom-
ics, argued that the entire arbitrary system of allocating domestic chores to 
women and not men was in need of wholesale reform.94 Margaret Sanger 
advocated sex education and the use of birth control as a means for women 
. I d' 95 to escape socleta omlnance. 
Other women believed that the vote was the one thing that would em-
power women to force politicians to take into consideration female 
89. Cady Stanton came from a well-off family in Johnstown, New York. Her father was 
an attorney who would placate his daughter's wishes to be freed from "maternal discipline" 
by allowing Elizabeth to sit in on meetings with clients and read the law books on the 
shelves. As she grew older, he took her with him occasionally to act as a legal assistant and 
encouraged her to study law. Cady Stanton became interested in abolitionism in the 1830s 
in many respects because that was what intellectuals in that area were focusing on at the 
time. Her brother-in-law Gerrit Smith was an early abolitionist, as was Henry Brewster 
Stanton, whom Elizabeth met in 1839. See id. at 7-19. 
90. Susan B. Anthony was born in 1820 and was raised as a Quaker. Similar to Lucretia 
Mott, Anthony opposed slavery on moral and religious grounds. As a young woman she 
worked toward the elimination of slavery within the abolitionist movement. Angered that, 
as a woman, she had no legal right to speak, Anthony linked more closely with the suffrage 
movement by 1851. See Bonnie Eisenberg & Mary Ruthsdotter, Susan B. Anthony, in 
HERSTORY, supra note 12, at 108. 
91. Lucy Stone writes of female Oberlin graduates not being allowed to read their own 
essays for Commencement exercises. Females selected to write essays were compelled to 
have a male professor read them. See Lucy Stone, Pioneer of Woman's Rights, in AMERICA 
THROUGH WOMEN'S EYES, supra note 14, at 187, 188-90. Brown was discouraged from 
theology at Oberlin and was eventually allowed by the college to take theology courses but 
not receive a degree. See Ruth Ashby, Antoinette Brown Blackwell, in HERSTORY, supra 
note 12, at 116-17. 
92. See Emanie Sachs, The Terrible Siren, in AMERICA THROUGH WOMEN'S EYES supra 
note 14, at 265, 266. Woodhull once said, "I am too many years ahead of this age." See id. 
While she is often labeled a "free lover" with a radical lifestyle, Woodhull was really no 
more than any modem day, flamboyant, successful, entrepreneur (male or female) who 
might now appear on the cover of Time Magazine. See generally LOIS BEACHY UNDERHILL, 
THE WOMAN WHO RAN FOR PRESIDENT: THE MANY LIVES OF VICTORIA WOODHULL (1995). 
93. See BANNER, supra note 88, at 10-19. 
94. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 55. 
95. See id. 
aiA 
6' 
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"concerns.,,96 Such concerns included the almost universal objection of 
married women to their legally imposed civil death97 and the discontent of 
all women who were foreclosed from educational opportunities by an all-
male academy.98 The suffrage faction ultimately became the "cause," per-
haps because the movement corresponded with the anti-slavery campaign 
that had voting rights as one of its own goals, and perhaps because the re-
quest was small in comparison to the wholesale societal changes advocated 
by some of the more radical feminists. 99 At the outset, the request for 
women's suffrage was itself considered radical but was eventually seen as 
"essential both as a symbol of women's equality and individuality and a 
means of improving women's legal and social condition."lOo 
The origins of the Suffrage Movement fell primarily within the origins 
of the Abolitionist Movement. 101 While popular history associates the 
name of Susan B. Anthony with the Suffrage Movement (solidified by her 
picture on the ironically obscure dollar coin), the Suffrage Movement was, 
in fact, a true collective effort with its influential members too numerous to 
mention. 102 Indeed, if anyone could have been said to be the leader of the 
movement it would probably be Elizabeth Cady Stanton.103 It was through 
the abolition movement that Stanton became acquainted with Lucretia 
Mott (already regarded as a feminist leader), Lucy Stone and Susan B. 
Anthony. 104 
Many of the abolitionists, particularly Stanton and Anthony, decided 
early on that their efforts should be directed towards establishing universal 
96. See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for 
the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 117 (1994). 
97. Married women could not enter into contracts, could not be property holders and 
could bring no action against an abusive spouse. For a discussion of the legal constraints 
upon women, see Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman 
Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRlM. L. REv. 229, 252-57 
(1996). 
98. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 51-52. 
99. See Lind, supra note 96, at 126-54. 
100. Marjorie S. Wheeler, Introduction to ONE WOMAN, ONE VOTE: REDISCOVERING THE 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 9 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995). 
10 1. See DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 31-32. The slavery issue was the issue of the day with 
the country sharply divided on the issue. The earliest abolitionists opposed slavery on the 
basis of benevolence and religious reasons, but these evolved into opposition on both philo-
sophical and political grounds. "Women's involvement in abolitionism developed out of 
traditions of peitistic female benevolence that were an accepted aspect of women's sphere in 
the early nineteenth century." Id. 
102. The most comprehensive listing of involved individuals and what occurred was 
compiled by the "suffragettes" themselves in a six volume history. See generally HISTORY 
OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 81. 
103. See BANNER, supra note 88, at 25-26. Stanton was the one who suggested to Lucretia 
Mott that a woman's rights convention be held. 
104. See DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 39. (Stone and Anthony were agents of the anti-
slavery society). 
AS 
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equality as opposed to simply abolishing slavery. 105 This notion was so-
lidified when Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton attended the 
World's Anti-Slavery Convention in 1840 and were relegated to watching 
from a balcony. 106 It was at this point that the women decided that in order 
for female voices to be heard, in both the United States and in Europe, they 
must first acquire the right to a voice in government. 107 The end result was 
the planning of the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 and the "Declaration 
of Sentiments" which included a resolution that "it is the duty of the 
women of this country to secure to themselves their sacred right of elective 
franchise." 108 
The Civil War put women's issues on the back burner and the Suffrage 
and Abolition Movements united to work towards emancipation of the 
slaves. I09 After the war, Stanton and Anthony were hopeful that they could 
return to campaigning for equal rights. l1O They were optimistic politically 
because supporters of women's equality had been so intertwined with the 
constituency who supported abolition.Il1 Although the activists returned to 
an aggressive campaign at the end of the war, they were not rewarded in 
the way they anticipated. 112 Not only did the "anti-slavery" amendments 
leave out any reference to women's equality but, in 1866, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was enacted, the text specifically provided penalties for 
any state that denied "males" over the age of twenty-one the right to 
vote. I13 
At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, Stanton com-
mented rather prophetically, "It will take us a century at least to get it 
105. See id. 
106. See AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-
1920, at 2 (1965). 
107. See id. 
108. Declaration of Sentiments, in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE supra note 81, at 70. 
Many women, including Lucretia Mott, did not want suffrage included as one of the de-
mands out of a fear the group "would look ridiculous." See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA 
SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 341 (1990). 
109. See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 108-13 (1975). 
110. See id. 
111. See DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 53. 
112. See id. 
113. The exact clause reads: 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Con-
gress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the num-
ber of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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OUt.,,114 In Minor v. Happersett,1I5 the Supreme Court solidified the fate of 
women's suffrage at the time by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Privileges and Immunities Clause did not provide women with any new 
privileges and immunities; the clause merely protected pre-existing rights. 
Accordingly, if women did not have entitlement to suffrage before the 
amendment, the new amendment did not ensure them the vote. 116 
The feminists thereafter found themselves without substantial support 
from the abolitionists whom they had supported earlier. It was not entirely 
a question of the withdrawal of sUpport,117 but a splintering of priorities. 
Abolitionists were not satisfied with the level of enfranchisement former 
slaves had achieved and worked primarily towards that goal subsequent to 
the Civil War.1I8 Those who prioritized women's suffrage were left in the 
wake of the larger, more politically popular, movement and lost the activ-
ism of some of their most capable members.1l9 Some supporters of the Re-
construction Amendments who might have otherwise supported suffrage, 
commented that it was "the Negro's hour" and believed feminist issues 
would have to wait their tum. 120 
After losing the battle to gain suffrage at the close of the Civil War, the 
movement lost considerable momentum. I21 Stanton and Anthony then car-
ried on what was regarded as the "radical" quest for suffrage with little 
support. I22 In fact, in 1872, Susan B. Anthony took matters into her own 
hands, registered as a voter and cast a ballot in a federal election. I23 She 
114. DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 61 (quoting a letter from Elizabeth Stanton to Gerrit 
Smith, January 1, 1866). 
115. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874). 
116. The Court drew upon the rationale that if the original Constitution had guaranteed the 
rights of all citizens to vote, it would not have been necessary to enact the Fifteenth 
Amendment which guaranteed that the right to vote would not be abridged "on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. at 175. Chief Justice Waite commented, 
"[I]f all were already protected why go through with the form of amending the Constitution 
to protect a part?" Id. at 175-76. 
117. There were some abolitionists who distanced themselves from the suffrage issue be-
cause supporting such a "radical" concept might jeopardize popular support for emancipa-
tion. See Vivian Sue Shields & Suzanne Melanie Buchko, Antoinette Dakin Leach: A 
Woman Before the Bar, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1994). 
118. See DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 54-55. 
119. "Overcoming the legacy of slavery was the burning issue of the day and it eclipsed all 
others." See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. ON. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1975). 
120. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Equity and Equality for Women-Ratification of International 
Covenants as a First Step, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 372 (1993) (referencing 
FLEXNER, supra note 109, at 142-43.). Defeis' editorialized quote reads, "this was 'the 
[male] Negro's hour'" which is more apropos since freed female slaves were granted no 
benefit by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
121. See CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 83, at 16-27. 
122. See Paula F. Casey, Tennessee's Vote for Women Decided the Nation: The Final 
Battle, 31 TENN. B.J. 20, 22-23 (1995). 
123. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873). 
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was subsequently arrested for violating a federal voting fraud statute. 124 
Anthony's trial is an interesting study of one person taking on the sys-
tem. At the trial, Anthony first objected to the absence of females on the 
jury.125 In response she was told that the trial was being conducted 
"according to the established forms of law.,,126 Anthony then stated: 
Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all made by men, interpreted 
by men, administered by men, in favor of men, and against women; 
and hence ... [ a] s then the slaves who got their freedom must take 
it over, or under, or through the unjust forms of law, precisely so 
now must women, to get their right to a voice in this Government 
take it; and I have taken mine, and mean to take it at every possible 
. 127 
opportumty. 
The judge told Anthony he would hear no more. 128 The all male jury found 
her guilty. 129 
Stanton's and Anthony's efforts continued throughout the end of the 
Nineteenth century, Mott had died in 1880.130 Gradually, with the help of 
a newer alliance of middle-class working women,131 the reconfigured Suf-
frage Movement gained some reforms within the states. 132 By the time the 
Nineteenth Amendment was ratified, a new generation of women activists 
emerged, including Dr. Anna Howard Show and Carrie Chapman Catt. 
Catt was the leader of the Suffrage Movement when the Nineteenth 
Amendment was ratified,133 with Stanton having passed away in 1902134 
and Anthony in 1906. 135 
124. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 
153 (1991). 
125. See MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 11 
(1994). 
126. See HOFF, supra note 124, at 159. 
127. 2 HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 687-88 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton et al. eds., 1881). 
128. See HOFF, supra note 124, at 159. 
129. See Nikolaus Benke, Women in the Courts: An Old Thorn in Men's Sides, 3 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 195,219 (1995). 
130. See SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 75, at 11. 
131. When women entered the World War I workforce, there was increased sentiment that 
women be given the right to vote. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 108, at 341. 
132. See Shields & Buchko, supra note 117, at 1194-99. The eventual ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment was a combination of the works of the early suffragists, a passage of 
time and the participation of the media. Women began publishing newsletters and maga-
zines in the mid-Nineteenth century that kept a nation apprised on what was happening 
within the movement and publicizing shared experiences. This created unity and more na-
tionwide awareness. See FLEXNER, supra note 109, at 150-52. See also FARBER & SHERRY, 
supra note 108, at 341. 
133. See KRADITOR, supra note 106, at 11-13. 
134. See SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 75, at 11. 
135. See id. 
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THE ABSENCE OF THE SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN LEGAL HISTORY 
Even contemporary legal texts do not treat the Suffrage Movement, 
and its many intersections with the formulation of Nineteenth century 
constitutional law, as a significant part of American legal history.136 Legal 
history often includes reference to "Married Women's Property Acts" and 
acknowledgment of past legal disenfranchisement as integral, but the 
ninety-year Suffrage Movement is often reduced to a page that perhaps in-
cludes the 1848 Seneca Falls "Declaration of Sentiments." 137 
By the same token, the treatment of the Abolition Movement, though it 
is regarded as important, shortchanges the contributions of females within 
the legal struggle. 138 Within our American legal history texts we will in-
variably find the Dred Scott decision.139 Of the essays students read, one 
might find an essay written by Frederick Douglass and occasionally a ref-
erence to Harriet Beecher Stowe. 140 Students of history in general will be 
familiar with John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry in 1859;141 however, 
few will recognize the names of Sarah and Angelina Grimke, both of 
whom embarked on an anti-slavery campaign in 1837.142 
History has found a way to separate Abolition from Women's Suffrage 
despite an almost synonymous identity between the two. History has also 
managed to convey to posterity that the anti-slavery campaign was a clash 
of men's political ideals when, in fact, it originated as a religious benevo-
lent movement that was primarily female. 143 When males and females 
have engaged in activities on the same plane, one has been marginalized 
while the other heralded. Our legal texts and the view of history presented 
to students would give those students no reason to believe otherwise. 
136. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997); 
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD 
CENTURY (1993); GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed. 1991); DONALD E. 
LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES, HISTORY AND DIALOGUES (1996); WILLIAM B. 
LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS (7th ed. 1991); 
GEOFFERY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996). 
137. See PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 4, at 545-49. 
138. See, e.g., LIVELY ET AL., supra note 136, at 438; STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. 
ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 493 (lst ed. 1980). 
139. Id. 
140. See PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 4, at 545-49. 
141. See E.D. HIRSCH JR. ET AL., THE DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY 
AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNow 237,244 (1988). 
142. See LERNER, supra note 6, at 97 -98. 
143. See DuBOIS, supra note 84, at 31-47. See also ALMA LUTZ, CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM: 
WOMEN OF THE ANTIS LA VERY MOVEMENT (1968). 
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PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM MYRA BRADWELL: THE SUPREME COURT 
REVISITED 
The Supreme Court of the late Nineteenth century heard several cases 
that dealt with women's issues. 144 Each case could have conceivably given 
the Court the opportunity to make strides in equality that the legislatures 
had not made. One such significant lost opportunity was the case of Myra 
Bradwell. 145 
Myra Bradwell was an illinois woman who had followed all of the ap-
propriate procedures in order to become an attorney.146 She had engaged 
in the requisite legal apprenticeship and passed the illinois bar exam. 147 
Despite this, the illinois bar refused to grant her a license. Their right to 
refuse the license was then validated by the Illinois courtS.148 The basis 
upon which Bradwell initially was not entitled to practice law was that illi-
nois law forbade married women from entering into contracts-i.e., Brad-
well could not enter into legally binding contracts with clients. 149 How-
ever, the illinois Supreme Court admitted that they would not allow 
Bradwell to practice law because she was a woman. 150 Subsequently, 
Bradwell appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 151 
Bradwell's attorney was Matthew Carpenter, a respected constitutional 
law lawyer who was an advocate of women's rights. 152 Carpenter became 
144. See Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 
Wall.) 162 (1874). 
145. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
146. Bradwell is acknowledged as the first female attorney in the United States even 
though that is not entirely true. Arabella Mansfield was granted a law license in Iowa six 
weeks before Bradwell passed the Illinois bar; however, Mansfield did not practice law. 
Additionally, after Bradwell was refused admission to the bar, she never reapplied despite a 
change in the law that she helped institute. It was a nunc pro tunc entry made by the Illinois 
Supreme Court near the time of Bradwell's death that granted a "retroactive" license going 
back to the date Bradwell passed the bar exam. See JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S FIRST 
WOMAN LAWYER 11-30 (1993). 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. In reaching their decision, the Illinois Supreme Court first decided that the legisla-
ture's use of gender-neutral language within the statute declaring who could practice law 
meant that it was intended females be excluded rather than included. The court next con-
cluded that if women were allowed to practice law, they might next want to hold other posi-
tions within government. Finally, the court commented that women within the law would 
destroy their "deference and delicacy" and that there would be an adverse effect on the ad-
ministration of justice. Id. at 18-20, citing In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535-39 (1872). 
151. Intriguingly enough, Bradwell, who was a renowned legal journalist and editor of the 
Chicago Legal News, had already helped craft and push for a statute that would allow 
women to practice law in Illinois. Had Bradwell reapplied a year after she was turned 
down, the Illinois Court would have been obligated to grant her license. See FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 146, at 21. 
152. See id. at 22. Bradwell's attorney, Matthew Carpenter, sought a narrow victory-
having the Court declare admission to practice by a woman a privilege and immunity. Car-
penter conceded that for the purposes of the argument and given the language of the Four-
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immersed in the project and argued eloquently before the High Court that 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause granted all persons an equal right to 
access the profession of law. 153 He also argued that it would be beneficial 
to the profession of law if clients could have a choice between male and 
female representation. 154 The State of lllinois, in response, apparently had 
nothing to say because it sent no opposing counsel. 155 Despite the one-
sided argument, Bradwell lost eight to one. 156 
Bradwell l57 is significant in women's legal history and within Ameri-
can Legal History for a variety of reasons. Obviously, it validated the per-
ceived societal view that only men should engage in some professions-a 
societal view constructed by an exclusively male legal system and then 
validated by an exclusively male judicial system, despite the protestations 
of women for whom the rules were made. However, there is more to the 
decision than that. Within the Court's decision was not only a validly rea-
soned theory that deferred to state sovereignty, but an editorial commen-
tary that demonstrated just how unrelenting the law would be when any 
underclass threatened the existing power structure. 158 
The decision to seek certiorari in Bradwell was perhaps an appropriate 
and timely strategy to challenge what was then a male-dominated power 
base. Women were working towards acquiring the right to vote. Myra 
Bradwell was already a respected individual within the lllinois legal com-
munity.159 If Bradwell succeeded in acquiring her license to practice law, 
there would have been much more potential for future female litigants to 
succeed on the basis of arguing inherent rights. It could have been a good 
start towards toppling some of the existing walls. 
Whether purposeful or not, Justice Miller (writing for the majority) 
was able to keep women from "back dooring" the power base by upholding 
the prohibition against females practicing law in lllinois on the basis of 
state's rights. 160 Relying on the Slaughterhouse Cases,161 Justice Miller 
teenth Amendment, the framers had not meant to ensure suffrage to women. Another inter-
esting aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment construction is that neither counsel nor the 
Court gave any attention to the Fourteenth Amendment clause requiring equal protection of 
the law. 
153. See Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 
465,469-70 (1994). 
154. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 24. 
155. See Angel, supra note 97, at 267-68 for a discussion of Bradwell in the context of 
female oppression. Angel also discusses early Supreme Court decisions that reflected une-
qual applications of the law as applied to minorities. [d. at 268-72. 
156. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 25-26. 
157. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
158. Bradwell likened the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to the Dred Scott case. See 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at 21. 
159. Carol D. Rasnic, Book Review, America's First Woman Lawyer: The Biography of 
Myra Bradwell, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 235-38 (1995). 
160. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 131-39. 
161. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). 
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acknowledged that females were citizens via interpreting the wording of 
the Constitution, but that state licensing of the practice of law was not 
controlled by the constitutional status of being a United States citizen. 162 
In this way, the Supreme Court deftly evaded any issue relating to female 
equality and established a precedent that would enable it to do the same 
when confronted with the suffrage issue and other cases in which women 
sought to enter the legal profession. 163 
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion is another story.l64 The Supreme 
Court, by way of Justice Bradley, did not stop with issuing a legal opinion 
linked to the theory of state's rights. 165 Rather, the Supreme Court en-
grafted upon legal history stereotyped prejudices about the capabilities of 
women.
166 Only this time, the Court did not take on the role of protecting 
women from rigorous physical work, but rather from rigorous mental 
work. 167 Justice Bradley comments: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a 
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and 
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. 
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil 
life. 168 
Bradley does not stop there. After commenting on some legal princi-
ples that validated a lack of a woman's legal existence separate from her 
husband, Bradley continued by stating: 
The humane movements of modem society, which have their ob-
ject the multiplication of avenues for woman's advancement, and 
of occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my heartiest 
concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is one of her fun-
damental rights and privileges to be admitted into every office and 
position, including those which require highly special qualifica-
tions and demanding special responsibilities. In the nature of 
162. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139. 
163. See, e.g., Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894). In Lockwood, the plaintiff at-
tempted to be admitted to the bar of Virginia on the basis of a state statute that provided, 
"Any person duly authorized and practicing as counselor attorney at law in any state or 
territory of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, may practice as such in the 
courts of this state." [d. The Supreme Court held that the state was free to construe the 
term "any person" as limited to males because the ability to practice law was not a 
"privilege or immunity." [d. at 116-17. 
164. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139-40. 
165. [d. at 139. 
166. See Laurie A. Keco, The Citadel: Last Male Bastion or New Training Ground, 46 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 479, 486 n.39 (1996). 
167. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42. 
168. [d. at 141. 
¥ 
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things it is not every citizen of every age, sex, and condition that is 
qualified for every calling and position. It is the prerogative of the 
legislator to prescribe regulations founded on nature, reason and 
experience for the due admission of qualified persons to profes-
sions and callings demanding special skill and confidence. 169 
295 
No doubt Bradley had in mind "male" legislators who had the prerogative 
of deciding regulations founded on "nature, reason, and experience. ,,170 It 
would also seem that Bradley was of the opinion that practicing law was a 
vocation that required skills and confidence that only men were capable of. 
Bradley's assessment was not maliciously intended, but based on a 
protectionist philosophy.171 He may have sincerely believed that prohibit-
ing women from practicing law was protecting them from the rigors of the 
profession when their temperament and physical features were more suited 
for the domestic sphere; however, with such brotherly protection, one 
would have to wonder whether women would be allowed any personally 
chosen accomplishment at all, or whether they would be recognized if and 
when they did have such achievement. In response to like attitudes, aboli-
tionist and suffragette Lucy Stone commented with frustration, "Too much 
has already been said and written about woman's sphere. . .. Leave 
women, then, to find their sphere .... ,,172 It is unlikely that Justice Brad-
ley was familiar with Stone's career at the time. In fact, Stone had estab-
lished her own career and made the comment twenty years prior to the 
Bradwell decision. 173 
" ... THESE ARE RARE AITAINMENTS FOR A DAMSEL, BUT PRAY TELL ME, 
CAN SHE SPIN?" 174: SEITING THE STAGE FOR PREJUDICE IN THE 
CLASSROOM 
Most certainly, if would-be attorneys who are men are never con-
fronted with a female authority figure or confronted with the reality of 
bright, articulate females in class or within legal history they will never be 
able to develop much respect for females as competent adversaries or even 
superiors. 175 This makes Justice Bradley's opinion much more damning 
169. [d. at 142. 
170. [d. 
171. It is intriguing to note that the "natural law" commented upon by the Supreme Court 
did, in no way, benefit slaves, not even the African-American female. Sojourner Truth, a 
slave for forty years commented, "Nobody ever help me into carriages or over mud puddles 
or gives me any best place-and aren't I a woman?" See LERNER, supra note 6, at 99 
(quoting NARRATIVE OF SOJOURNER TRUTH 134 (Battle Creek, 1884». 
172. HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 81, at 165. 
173. See id. 
174. James I, upon being introduced to a woman proficient in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. 
MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 70, at 617. 
175. Alice de Rivera (commenting on high schools) stated, "A boy who has never worked 
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than it otherwise might have been. It was a perception of women's inferi-
ority which was validated by the highest Court in the land, a perception 
that took on a life of its own as the 1800s drew to a close. 
Legal scholarship near the time period during which the Nineteenth 
Amendment was ratified reflects this view. One student writing for the 
Virginia Law Review concluded that women were legally excluded from 
juries, not on the basis of prejudice, but "in the best interest of the com-
munity.,,176 A second note written by another student at the University of 
Virginia assessed that if all women gained suffrage, a "mass" of Negro 
women would be added to the electorate, "most of whom would be wholly 
lacking the character and qualifications which alone fit a citizen for the art 
of self-govemment."I77 A Columbia law student presumably assumed only 
men could be geniuses, but otherwise conceded that, "[W]omen, if simi-
larly trained, could generally compete on an equal footing with men.,,178 
Finally, one author, commenting on the debate as to whether women 
should serve on juries, stated, "Man has few enough rights left without im-
pairing his age old right to a warm dinner, subject only to the equally an-
cient qualification of his spouse to prepare it.,,179 
The notion of the importance of a "men's only" legal history extended 
beyond law review articles. An excerpt from the book jacket summary of 
Rene A. Wormser's 1949 novel, The Story of the Law and the Men Who 
Made It180 reads: 
For The Story of the Law tells the entire history of man's search for 
justice and of the great men who led that search throughout the 
long process of evolution of which our own democracy is the end 
product. 
The creation of laws involves far more than just the work of legis-
lators. Religious and military leaders, philosophers, presidents, 
dictators, and fanatics have all played their part. So the pages of 
with a girl in the classroom is bound to think of her as his intellectual inferior, and will not 
treat her as if she had capacity for understanding things other than child-care and homemak-
ing." Alice de Rivera, On Desegregating Stuyvesant High, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 366, 
371 (Robin Morgan ed., 1970). This is also appropriate with respect to legal education. 
176. Note, Constitutionality Under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Proposed Nine-
teenth Amendment of State Laws Limiting Jury Service to Male Citizens, 6 VA. L. REv. 589, 
591 (1920). 
177. Emmet O'Neal, The Susan B. Anthony Amendment: Effect of Its Ratification on the 
Rights of the States to Regulate and Control Suffrage and Elections, 6 VA. L. REV. 338, 357 
(1920). 
178. Note, Current Legislation, Equalizing the Legal Status of the Sexes, 21 COLUM. L. 
REv. 712 (1921). 
179. Angel, supra note 97, at 274 n.359 (quoting Women Jurors, 26 LAW NOTES 224 
(1923)). 
180. RENE A. WORMSER, THE STORY OF THE LAW AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT-FROM THE 
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1949). 
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The Story of the Law are filled with the names and deeds of fa-
. 181 
mous men III many areas .... 
Wormser meant what he said. There is not one woman highlighted in 
the book. Whether purposeful or inadvertent, Wormser limits the major 
"equality" issues in the Nineteenth century to "Law for the Poor Man,,,182 
"Equality for the Negro,,,183 "Equality for the Indian,,,184 and "Equality for 
Orientals.,,185 There is only one sentence relating to Women's Suffrage. I86 
Other historical works of the period are similarly bereft of any reference to 
women,I87 as are Supreme Court decisions relating to other forms of ine-
quality.I88 While the melting pot composition of the United States seem-
ingly made it important to highlight unacceptable prejudices towards 
groups such as "Celtic Irishmen,,,189 it was as late as 1961 that the Supreme 
Court was still proclaiming that women could, and perhaps should, be kept 
off of juries because of their domestic responsibilities. I90 
"No MATfER WHAT YOUR FIGHT, DON'T BE LADYLIKE!"I9I: THE STORY OF 
MOTHER JONES 
Not all women of historical note were frustrated graduates of a uni-
versity, products of unconventional upbringing, philanthropic ladies of lei-
sure working for great humanitarian pursuits 192 or thwarted professionals. 
Many women placed themselves at the heart of controversy simply because 
it was the right "sphere" for them at the time. Their historical significance 
is seemingly acknowledged within different realms, such as within 
'Women's Studies.' However, in the larger scheme of things, such women 
have become invisible while their male contemporaries are spotlighted on 
181. [d. (quote from book jacket). 
182. [d. at 384. 
183. [d. at 405. 
184. [d. at 408. 
185. [d. at 409. 
186. It reads, "On the credit side, the Nineteenth Amendment, giving women the right to 
vote, was enacted during Wilson's regime, after a long suffragette struggle marked by bit-
terness and ridicule." [d. at 429. 
187. See, e.g., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: ESSAYS BY EDWARD CORWIN 
(Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey eds., 1964). 
188. See, e.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896) (race); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination against Chinese); Soon Hing v. Crawley, 113 U.S. 703 
(1885); Bush v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 
U.S. 370 (1881) (race); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (race). 
189. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
190. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 18 (1961). 
19l. MARY HARRIS JONES, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MOTHER JONES 204 (1925) 
[hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHY]. 
192. See BOULDING, supra note 2, at 625-60. 
w.". t * 
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the historical stage. Mother Jones was one of these rare women given 
some attention, albeit in marginalized studies. 
Mary Harris (Mother) Jones was born (she claimed) in 1830, an immi-
grant from Cork, Ireland. 193 She was originally a teacher, but by 1861 she 
was married with four children. 194 In 1867, Jones lost her husband and all 
four children to yellow fever. 195 She moved to Chicago and turned to the 
Knights of Labor in 1871 when the Chicago fire left her without posses-
sions. 196 In 1880, at the age of fifty, Mother Jones became a full-time labor 
activist. 197 At first, her only involvement was telling people in the area to 
join with the union in order to gain better working conditions; however, 
when the Knights recognized what an impassioned advocate she was, they 
asked that she advocate their cause on a more widespread basis.198 With 
the support of the Knights, advocating the rights of laborers became Jones' 
lifetime dedication. 199 
After a seventeen-year career as a labor advocate, Jones became a full-
time organizer for the United Mine Workers. 2OO It was as an organizer of 
mine workers that Jones first gained national fame. Wherever there were 
strikes or organizing movements, Jones was there, encouraging the miners, 
offering her support and being ornery towards any of the company men 
who tried to dissuade her from her mission.201 She taunted company work-
ers to "shoot an old woman" if they dared and boldly did all she was for-
bidden to do. 202 Risking arrest and even potential assassination every-
where she went, Jones' ability to inspire laborers stemmed both from her 
audacity and her willingness to live in the same conditions as the workers. 
Even though over sixty, she hiked the West Virginia mountains, slept in 
the dirt and did without food when there was none for others.203 
Jones' activities were not restricted to the United Mine Workers. In 
time, Jones became involved wherever there were workers she thought 
were being treated unfairly. In the 1890s she became active in organizing 
the Textile Workers' Union and worked towards eliminating the exploita-
tion of child labor.204 She had ideas for publicity that were innovative and 
193. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 191, at 11. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. at 12. 
196. See id. 
197. See id. at 13-17. 
198. See JUDITH PINKERTON JOSEPHSON, MOTHER JONES: FIERCE FIGHTER FOR WORKER'S 
RIGHTS 32 (1997). 
199. See id. at 39. 
200. See id. at 95. 
201. See id. at 105-19. 
202. LINDA ATKINSON, MOTHER JONES, THE MOST DANGEROUS WOMAN IN AMERICA 84 
(1978). 
203. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 62-63. 
204. See ATKINSON, supra note 202, at 114-33. 
* 
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were guaranteed to make the general public aware of the workers' plight. 
In 1903 she organized child laborers for a twenty-two day march from 
Kensington, New Jersey to President Theodore Roosevelt's summer home 
on Long Island.2os Along the way, she held demonstrations and used the 
press to her advantage by showing them the mutilated hands of the child 
workers. 206 By the time she finished the march, there were few people who 
were not aware of what was happening to children in the textile industry.207 
Jones next worked with the Mine Workers in Colorado. Disguised as 
an old peddler, she was able to investigate the conditions of the workers 
and report on such conditions to union officials.208 After Colorado, Jones' 
path intersected with the Western Federation of Mineworkers and then 
with Bill Haywood, of the International Workers of the World. 209 Near the 
age of eighty, Jones rallied for railroad workers, copper miners and women 
bottlers in Wisconsin?lO While encouraging striking miners in Paint Creek 
and Cabin Creek, West Virginia, Jones' ended up being court-marshalled 
before a military tribunal and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 211 After 
a public outcry, Jones was released in three months.212 
Mary Harris Jones lived to be one hundred and did not slow down until 
the very end of her life.213 She never really lived anywhere and often car-
ried her possessions with her. 214 Most of the money she acquired she gave 
to others.21S Within this lifestyle Jones gained enough notoriety and influ-
ence to be consulted by politicians and company representatives who 
wanted to prevent unrest from turning into labor violence.216 J ones advo-
cated strikes and organization as a means to remedy the disparity between 
the haves and the have-nots.217 Within her activism she never differentiated 
between men and women. Indeed she believed that women (and perhaps 
even children) were more useful on the picket line than were men. She ad-
vocated whatever it took to get things done and refused to bow down to 
convention or power. For Jones it was simply the right thing to dO. 218 
205. See id. at 120. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. at 133. 
208. See id. at 138-39. 
209. See id. at 158-62. 
210. See id. at 167. 
211. See THE COURT-MARTIAL OF MOTHER JONES (Edward M. Steel Jf. ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter COURT-MARTIAL]' 
212. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 115. 
213. See ATKINSON, supra note 202, at 226-34. 
214. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 62-63. 
215. Seeid.at63. 
216. See id. at 13, 125, 129-30. 
217. See ATKINSON, supra note 202, at 100. 
218. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 136. 
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THE ABSENCE OF MOTHER JONES WITHIN LABOR STUDY 
"Mother Jones is one of the most forceful and picturesque figures of 
the American labor movement," Clarence Darrow comments in his Intro-
duction to the Autobiography of Mother Jones. 219 Called the "most dan-
gerous woman in America,,,22o she was one of the most well-known labor 
activists of her time. It is remarkable that she has receded into the invisible 
vapors of both legal and nonlegal history. Jones-a contemporary and 
friend of both Eugene Debs and Clarence Darrow-has vanished, while the 
other two have become rooted within our collective consciousness as 
monuments to dedication and fairness. 221 Jones faded away, while men of 
similar, if not lesser, achievements gained recognition. Debs, a member of 
the Socialist party, became associated with the Pullman train strike222 and 
the cause of the common man; however, few people recall Jones' contri-
butions to the Labor Movement. 223 Fewer still would know that Jones was 
instrumental in establishing the International Workers of the W orId. 224 
It is a curious interpretation of what is historically noteworthy. While 
one biographer writes that Jones remains relatively unkown because there 
was little written about her,225 there seems to be no lack of information on 
Jones within books that detail women left out of history.226 One reason for 
excluding Jones' contributions appears to be that the individuals writing 
legal history deemed her male contemporaries more worthy of inclusion. 
Another reason might very well be that the study of our country's legal de-
velopment, which seems only to acknowledge legal history derived through 
published cases, leaves out influential individuals about whom our highest 
courts have never had the opportunity to comment. 227 
219. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 191, at xxi. 
220. JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 105; ATKINSON, supra note 202, at 1. 
221. A Westlaw search conducted on Sept. 4, 1998 of the TP-ALL database discovered 
two articles of substance on the work of Mother Jones. See, e.g., John M. Husband, The 
Colorado Coal Wars of 1913 and 1914: Some Issues Still Debated Today, 26 COLO. LAW. 
147 (1997); William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. 
L. REv. 11 09 (1989). A search of the terms "Eugene Debs" and "Clarence Darrow" yielded 
105 and 439 results respectively. 
222. See Forbath, supra note 221, at 1161. 
223. See supra note 221. 
224. See COURT-MARTIAL, supra note 211, at 3-4. 
225. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 198, at 7. 
226. See BOULDING, supra note 2, at 641. See generally HERSTORY, supra note 12. 
227. This, in fact, might be a kind overstatement. Harriet Scott's suit for freedom simply 
disappeared in the wake of her husband's case. She was certainly a part of American legal 
history and part of an important constitutional law case that is studied in every Constitu-
tional Law class in the country but she is somehow left out both then and now. See Leslye 
M. Huff, Deconstructing Sodomy 22-34 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
While there might be some justification for ignoring Mother Jones because she was not a 
part of traditional legal history (e.g., case law study), there is not a similar justification for 
what has happened with Harriet Scott. 
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WOMEN AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 
The intersection between women's equality issues, labor issues and 
Socialism should come as no surprise to the astute observers of history. 228 
The Socialist movement was gaining momentum in Europe and in the 
United States.229 In the late Nineteenth century there seemed no other ave-
nue of redress for the factory and mineworkers?30 Women associated 
themselves with the Socialist movement, much as they had done with the 
Abolitionist Movement-partially for benevolent reasons, partially be-
cause women recognized themselves as an oppressed class.231 
This liaison took an interesting tum in connecting itself with main-
stream constitutional theory in the early Twentieth century in the case of 
Whitney v. Caiifornia.232 Whitney involved the constitutional challenge of 
California's Syndicalism Law which, in simplified terms, criminalized 
speech related to anti-government sentiments or activities.233 Because 
there was an overall suspicion of Socialism and its relationship to revolu-
tion and anarchy, many Socialist activities (including merely organizing) 
were deemed violations of this law.234 
Anita Whitney, the defendant in the case, was a fifty-two year old 
woman-a philanthropist-who was an admitted member of the Commu-
nist Party and an individual who advocated peaceful labor reform.235 She 
was arrested after appearing at an International Workers of the World con-
vention. The International Workers of the World was known for advocat-
ing violence, and it was upon this premise that Whitney was prosecuted, 
228. For a discussion of the intersection between labor and free speech issues, see Geof-
frey D. Bennan, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in the 
1930's, 80 VA. L. REv. 291 (1994). 
229. See BOULDING, supra note 2, at 625-28. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. at 627 -28. 
232. 274 U.S. 357 (1926). 
233. For a discussion of the history of speech protections, prohibitions, and the genesis of 
the syndicalism laws, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1941). Chafee was a known scholar of First Amendment jurisprudence during the early 
part of the Twentieth century. His 1941 book was a rewrite of the original, cited in Whitney, 
274 U.S. at 376, nn.4-5. 
234. The pertinent part of the Syndicalism Act under which Whitney was prosecuted 
reads, "Any person who ... organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a 
member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assem-
bled to advocate, teach, or aid and abet criminal syndicalism ... is guilty of a felony .... " 
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 359. Syndicalism itself was defined as 
/d. 
any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the 
commission of crime, sabotage [hereby defined as meaning willful and ma-
licious physical damage or injury to physical property], or unlawful acts of 
force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accom-
plishing a change in industrial ownership or control or effecting any political 
change. 
235. See CHAFEE, supra note 233, at 343-44. 
. 
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and eventually convicted, for violating the criminal syndicalism law. 236 
After an appellate process that took nearly seven years, the United States 
S C I . I d·· 237 upreme ourt u tlmate y grante certIOrarI. 
The Whitney decision is now regarded as one of the most important 
cases in our study of First Amendment jurisprudence?38 It was within that 
decision that both Justice Brandeis (writing the concurrence) and Justice 
Holmes crafted the philosophy which would be the foundation of our mod-
ern understanding of First Amendment protections-that "to be afraid of 
ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-government.,,239 Whitney, herself, 
did not fare so well in the majority's opinion (although she had been par-
doned); the Court determined that the statute did not violate either the Due 
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 240 The Court opinion stated that the statute was not vague or am-
biguous and added that a state was entitled to enact legislation aimed at 
eradicating what "it deems to be an existing evil.,,241 Although suit was 
not brought specifically on First Amendment grounds, the Court did reit-
erate the holdings of its most recent speech cases to the effect that free 
speech was a "liberty" restricting state power. 242 Nevertheless, the Court 
opinion declared that "[fJreedom of speech secured by the Constitution 
does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever 
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license, giving immunity 
for every possible use of language, and preventing punishment of those 
abusing this freedom. ,,243 
Justice Brandeis concurred with the Court's judgment. However, he 
based his concurrence on the belief that the defendant had waived her right 
to have basic speech issues reviewed.244 Nonetheless, he strongly disa-
greed with the majority's interpretation of what would be protected 
speech.245 Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney has since become the corner-
stone of modem First Amendment jurisprudence. It was the first procla-
mation that the right to criticize one's government emanated from the in-
tentions of the founding fathers. Until that point, there had been no 
236. For a history of Anita Whitney and the background of the case, see Vincent Blasi, 
The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. 
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 655-58 (1988). 
237. Seeid. at 663. 
238. See id. at 671-72. 
239. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 28 (1960). 
240. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 401, 402 
(Elder Witt ed., 2d ed. 1990). 
241. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 370. 
242. [d. at 371-72. 
243. [d. at 371. 
244. [d. at 380. 
245. [d. at 373-79. 
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consensus on what the nation's founding leaders intended, and laws re-
stricting speech were routinely passed within the states.246 
Despite Whitney's significance, Anita Whitney and any socialist cause 
she may have originally had has slipped into an historical void. While 
Whitney is often studied for its concurrence, its intersection with other is-
sues, such as labor reform and women's equality, is rarely acknowledged. 
Moreover, while Anita Whitney, a female, makes her appearance as a lead 
character who stealthily slips into the annals of constitutionally significant 
case law, her "appearance" has quite obviously become overshadowed by 
the perceived "accomplishment" and innovation of Louis Brandeis?47 
Over a thousand law review articles have been written referencing Bran-
deis' First Amendment philosophies;248 not one has been written on Anita 
Whitney, or more appropriately, what Whitney represented: the influence 
of women on the developing jurisprudence of this country.249 
"So WE BEAT ON, BOATS AGAINST THE CURRENT, BORNE BACK 
CEASELESSLY INTO THE PAST,,250: WOMEN'S STRUGGLE FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION 
If we, as legal educators, open up most of our own textbooks and 
look for references to the significant achievements of women throughout 
the course of legal jurisprudential development during the Nineteenth and 
early Twentieth centuries, we will find scarce few. 251 If we try to gauge 
the contributions of women to developing constitutional theory during this 
same time frame within these texts, we will find it sparse. Although 
"progressive" thinking within the legal academy in recent years has begun 
to reconsider some of this historical marginalization,252 there is still a fun-
damental problem in what legal history is presented to our students, and 
how it is presented. It is not that women within legal history remain totally 
unacknowledged; it is that law schools tend to separate out those achieve-
ments as if they belong to a distinct realm, "women's" history or 
246. See generally Blasi, supra note 236. 
247. A Westlaw search conducted on September 8, 1998 in the TP-All database revealed 
265 articles with a reference to the "Brandeis Brief." 
248. A Westlaw search conducted on September 8, 1998 in the TP-All database revealed 
1041 articles making reference to Louis Brandeis and the First Amendment. 
249. A Westlaw search conducted on September 8, 1998 in the TP-All database revealed 
14 total references to "Anita Whitney." This includes passing references. 
250. F. SCOrrFIlZGERALD, 1'HEGREATGATSBY 182 (1925). 
251. See supra note 136. 
252. A growing number of law schools offer electives in "Feminist Jurisprudence" and 
"Women and the Law." While much of this study is not regarded as mainstream legal edu-
cation, it does allow students the opportunity to learn about issues that are not otherwise 
taught. See generally Anita Bernstein, A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year Curriculum, 46 
J. LEGALEDUC. 217 (1996). 
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"women's" law. 253 This separation is apparent within the newly developed 
courses, as well as within revised substantive texts that segregate a per-
ceived female issue, or a "feminist" approach to law, from the entirety of 
mainstream legal study. 254 
Special courses about "women's" achievements and influence, how-
ever well intended, send the wrong message-women' s achievements, 
such as they are, are different, less important and on the periphery of 
America's legal stage.255 Women's achievements are already in existence 
within the universal human history.256 What needs to be done is to diag-
nose and cure the institutional perpetuation that "male" historical influ-
ence, especially within Constitutional Law, is more noteworthy than 
"female" historical influence. 
Gender integration of both law schools and the legal profession are 
often proclaimed to be of recent vintage; however, it is debatable as to 
whether this is really true. 257 Additionally, it remains unclear whether law 
schools, institutionally, have yet to face up to the fact that the standard 
curriculum still marginalizes female influence on jurisprudential develop-
ment.258 As early as 1971, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then teaching at Rutgers, 
lamented the lack of female representation within law school curricu-
lum.259 Nearly thirty years later, the same deficiencies arguably still exist. 
Each year, standard casebooks by the "recognized" legal experts tend to be 
253. See id. (discussing the integration of feminist issues within a first-year curriculum). 
254. Teaching methods mirror this stratification, at least in terms of perception. While the 
teaching of Labor Law, Constitutional Law, Contracts and other required substantive 
courses rely primarily on the casebook method and are expected to be cold, logical and seri-
ous, courses such as "Gender Discrimination," and "Women in the Law" often convey to the 
student a lax atmosphere before a female professor who will be teaching a course regarded 
as peripheral to the Academy's main mission. See generally Christine Haight Farley, Con-
fronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Academy, 8 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 333 (1996). 
255. In writing a supplemental casebook for Constitutional Law courses, Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg commented: 
The new direction toward equal rights and responsibilities for women and 
men as constitutional principle is a development likely to affect the profes-
sional and social lives of all law students; it is a matter too important to be 
compartmentalized for treatment only in specialized courses with limited en-
rollment. 
RUTH BADER GINSBURG, TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION III (1974). 
256. See Linda Gordon, What's New in Women's History, in A READER IN FEMINIST 
KNOWLEDGE 73-75 (Sneja Gunew ed., 1991). 
257. See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Women's Work: The Place of Women in Law 
Schools, 321. LEGAL EDUC. 272, 273 (1982) (quoting CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP 
AND USE: CASES STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIALS (1968». 
258. Presser and Zainaldin' s first edition of their law and American history text (published 
in 1980) has no reference to any female-oriented legal issues, including Suffrage. See 
PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 138. 
259. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Treatment of Women by the Law: Awakening Conscious-
ness in The Law Schools, 5 VAL. U. L. REv. 480, 484 (1971). 
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assigned.260 These may be revised and edited, maybe adding a segment in-
corporating a previously excluded women's issue.261 Yet there seemingly 
continues to be acceptance of the major gender premises implicit in the 
works.262 
Although cases are represented more-or-Iess as inanimate pieces of 
logic within the legal development of this country, it is a mistake to believe 
that they are gender-Iess. 263 The law presented to our students is that de-
veloped by males within a male society emphasizing the achievements of 
men during whatever historical time period is being represented. 264 The 
traditional course of study has been limited primarily to constitutions, 
codes and cases. These were, by virtue of what was happening histori-
cally, written devices of the male-empowered legal system. If our study is 
limited primarily to these devices, we will relegate our students to studying 
a masculine legal historical development. 
As a consequence, leaving out essays and other writings from our sub-
stantive texts precludes a large amount of female representation within le-
gal history. Many contemporary Constitutional Law texts now include 
sources, other than cases, with greater representation of female scholars.265 
However, the bulk of writings by female authors tend to appear in the 
260. Publishers Aspen Law and Business (formerly Little & Brown) describes Constitu-
tional Law by Stone et.al, supra note 136, as "phenomenally popular." ASPEN LAW & 
BUSINESS, LAW SCHOOL PUBLICATIONS 1997 15 (1997) (promotional literature, on file 
author). Farnsworth's and Young's Contracts text is in its fifth edition and has been 
adopted at over one hundred law schools. See Geoffrey R. Watson, Casebook Review, A 
Casebook For All Seasons?, 20 SEATILE U. L. REv. 277, 277 (1997). Prosser on Torts, 
now in its ninth edition, is reported by Foundation Press to be its most popular Torts text. 
Interview with Foundation Press (June 13, 1997). 
It is not my intention to claim that these texts are not good; I would, however, like to 
point out the reluctance of the legal academy as a whole to change any aspect of itself. If 
there is never a demand for a different form of presentation made to publishers, the same 
texts will be supplied from year to year, or at least the same format of the texts. There 
would be neither a need for publishers to modify their offerings, nor would there be a need 
for aspiring book authors to attempt anything stylistically different. Current teaching meth-
odology is, in a sense, perpetuated by economic feasibility. 
261. See, e.g., PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra note 4, at 545-69, 999-1033. 
262. Mary Joe Frog has written about how textbooks may subtly perpetuate male domi-
nance in law by the material selected and the means for presentation selected. Frog points 
to an overrepresentation of male plaintiffs, cases that feature situations with stereotypical 
roles, and the judicial characterization of featured females within the opinions. See Mary 
Joe Frog, Rereading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of A Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. 
L. REv. 1065 (1985). 
263. See Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 453, 454 (David Kairys 
ed., 1990). 
264. Frances Olsen comments, "[A]ccording to dominant ideology, law is male, not fe-
male. Law is supposed to be rational, objective abstract, and principled, as men claim they 
are; it is not supposed to be irrational, subjective, contextualized, or personalized, as men 
claim women are." [d. at 454. For a discussion of men as rational and logical, see CAROL 
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
265. See, e.g, supra note 136. 
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context of a gender-related discussion?66 The majority of venerated con-
stitutional law "scholars" are overwhelmingly male. 267 Although there 
were many prolific female authors in the Nineteenth century who wrote 
eloquently about contemporary issues, their work usually does not appear 
in our legal texts.268 This is, no doubt, because their work was not, and is 
still not, considered traditional legal scholarship that could be used in 
conjunction with the case method of study. 
To that end, there is no denying Constitutional Law texts include men-
tion of most Supreme Court cases dealing with female litigants or female 
rights issues during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. 269 It is 
intriguing, however, that few people would recall these cases, let alone 
their significance within legal history. This is primarily because their 
manner of presentation does not make them particularly memorable or 
significant. 
For instance, most Constitutional Law texts present Muller v. Oregon 
266. Although it is often difficult to tell the gender of the author within the texts that use 
essays and book excerpts for sources, the lengthiest footnotes listing secondary authority 
appear within the Equal Protection-Gender Discrimination sections of the text. It is within 
these sections that the most familiar female authors (such as, Catherine MacKinnon, Andrea 
Dworkin, Patricia Williams, Frances Olsen, Rebecca West and Deborah Rhode) appear. See 
LIVELY ET AL., supra note 136, at 633-73; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 1339-49; 
STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 728-30. Stone includes a section on pornography and the 
victimization of women that cites secondary references authored by women. See STONE ET 
AL., supra note 136, at 1317-22. 
267. See LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 1-75; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 
xxxv-xxxviii. See also MICHAEL J. GLENNON ET AL., A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 
xi-xvi (2d ed. 1997). 
268. The writings include, books, essays, letters and addresses written by females during 
the Nineteenth century. Although there are too many to mention specifically, these include 
JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS (1907); JANE ADDAMS, THE HOUSING 
PROBLEM IN CHICAGO (1902); Address of Angelina Grimke to the National Anti-Slavery 
Convention, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 83, at 73-77; Address of Victoria Woodhull to 
the Judiciary Committee, SCOTI & SCOTI, supra note 75, at 75-80; Appeal and Petition for 
a Sixteenth Amendment, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 83, at 304-06; TENESSEE C. CLAFLIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY (Hyperion, 1976) (1871); Margaret Fuller, The Great Lawsuit. 
Man versus Men: Women versus Women (Woman in the Nineteenth Century), in MARGARET 
FULLER: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LIFE AND LEITERS 82 (Joel Myerson ed., 1978) (first printed 
in 1875); Matilda Joslyn Gage, Preceding Causes, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 83, at 51-
68; CHARLOITE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS (1898); SARAH A GRIMKE, 
LEITERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Elizabeth Ann Bartlett ed., 
1988); BELLE KEARNEY, A SLAVEHOLDER'S DAUGHTER (1900); Louisa S. McCord, Enfran-
chisement of Woman, in THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADmON: 1630-1865, at 403 
(David A. Hollinger & Charles Capper eds., 1997); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Politics of 
Woman Suffrage, 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 127, at 348-55; MERCY OTIS 
WARREN, HISTORY OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND TERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN REVO-
LUTION (Lester H. Cohen ed., 1988); FRANCES WRIGHT, COURSE OF POPULAR LECTURES 
(1829). For a lengthy bibliography containing historical materials about women's historical 
influences, see MARY BEARD, WOMAN AS FORCE IN HISTORY 341-69 (1946). 
269. See supra notes 55, 57, 59, 114, 143,231. 
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as a note case following Lochner v. New York.270 It is generally lumped 
together with Bunting v. Oregon,271 possibly Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal,272 and "Yellow Dog" contracts preventing unionization. 273 There gen-
erally is a short discussion about Muller and the subject of "female" labor 
and invariably a mention of the "Brandeis Brief,274 statistically highlight-
ing female "delicacies.,,275 One might ask whether this is not a significant 
acknowledgement for females existing within legal history, at least in a 
realistic sense. I would pose that it is not. 
Aside from the fact that Louis Brandeis has probably become the most 
memorable part of Muller,276 the usual presentation of Muller trivializes 
female influence. As a note case, it would seem to give the indication that 
it is not very significant. Additionally, any included quotation that refer-
ences "female delicacies" makes it evidently a case about gender. Its rela-
tion to Lochner and the Court's overall historic views on judicial legisla-
tion and freedom to contract are rarely acknowledged apart from the 
gender aspect.277 Moreover, Justice Sutherland's contradictory opinions in 
Adkins and Radice v. New York, and their relation to Justice Brewer's 
opinion in Muller are never discussed at length despite the universal ac-
knowledgment that Lochner was followed by a lengthy period of contradic-
tory case law. 278 
Myra Bradwell appears to have been relegated to a similar fate as that 
of Muller. While Bradwell's case has often become a staple of contempo-
rary Constitutional Law texts, if included, it generally heads up the section 
on Gender Discrimination.279 While it cannot be denied that Bradwell is 
270. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 483; WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. 
VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 522-23 (9th ed. 1993); GUNTHER, 
supra note 136, at 445; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 352; RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 349-51 (4th ed. 1993); STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 
825,830. 
271. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 483-84; COHEN & V ARAT, supra note 
270, at 512; GUNTHER, supra note 136, at 445; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 352; 
ROTUNDA, supra note 270, at 350; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 830. 
272. See, e.g., COHEN & V ARAT, supra note 270, at 523; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 
136, at 352; ROTUNDA, supra note 270, at 351; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 830. 
273. See, e.g., COHEN & V ARAT, supra note 270, at 512; LOCKHART ET AL., supra 136, at 
352; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 830. 
274. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 483; COHEN & V ARAT, supra note 270, at 
522; FARBER ET AL., supra note 136, at 302; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 352; 
ROTUNDA, supra note 270, at 349-50; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 825. 
275. See, e.g., COHEN & V ARAT, supra note 270, at 522; ROTUNDA, supra note 270, at 
350; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 825. 
276. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 483. 
277. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 825. 
278. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 484; GUNTHER, supra note 136, at 444-
45; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 351-52. 
279. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 599; GUNTHER, supra note 136, at 659; 
LIVELY ET AL., supra note 136, at 633; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 1339; STONE ET 
AL., supra note 136, at 697. But see FARBER ET AL., supra note 136, at 298, which heads up 
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ultimately a case about gender discrimination, it involves many other is-
sues. Decided the day after the Slaughterhouse Cases,280 Bradwell in-
volves similar issues regarding a state's police powers and the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause?81 High-
lighting Bradwell as "gender-related" separates it from mainstream Consti-
tutional Law. It relegates the case as a feminine "add-on" to the study of 
Constitutional Law and thus minimizes its significance. Minor v. Happer-
sett has fared even worse than Bradwell. Minor is rarely included within 
Constitutional Law texts. 282 This is true despite its relationship to earlier 
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and its overlap 
with issues relating to the interpretations of the anti-slavery amend-
ments.283 
The greatest marginalization, however, appears to have been done to 
the Suffrage Movement. Even within the Constitutional texts that include 
an historic overview of the period in which the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments were enacted, the Suffrage Movement is generally 
not mentioned.284 In a 1971 article, at a time in which the Equal Rights 
Amendment was being debated, Ruth Ginsburg proclaimed that leaving out 
a mention of the Equal Rights Amendment in contemporary texts is like 
leaving out Brown v. Board of Education. 285 This is similarly true for the 
Suffrage Movement. Failing to acknowledge the impact of the Suffrage 
Movement within legal history is tantamount to disregarding nearly all 
feminist contributions to the development of legal theory prior to the 
1970s.286 A comparable, if not unimaginable, parallel would be the elimi-
nation of any material regarding slavery, abolitionism and racial discrimi-
nation prior to Brown v. Board of Education had the Thirteenth, Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments not been ratified until the mid-Twentieth cen-
tury. 
There are many steps law schools might take to ensure that the ac-
complishments of females within legal history are not marginalized. First 
and foremost, however, there must be a recognition of the problem. While 
the Gender Discrimination section with the writings of Abigail Adams and reference to the 
Suffrage Movement. 
280. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 697. 
281. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 u.S. (16 Wall) 130, 139 (1872). 
282. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 600; FARBER ET AL., supra note 136, at 
301; STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 698. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall) 162 
(1874). 
283. But see STONE ET AL., supra note 136, at 611. 
284. See, e.g., COHEN & VARAT, supra note 270, at 21-23; GUNTHER, supra note 136, at 
396-400; LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 136, at 342-43. But see FARBER ET AL., supra note 
136, at 299-300, which includes a section on the Suffrage Movement, its relationship to 
Abolitionism and the anti-slavery amendments. 
285. See Ginsburg, supra note 259, at 484; Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
( 1955). 
286. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
fa it"' 
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many law schools now include feminist issues or the feminine perspective 
within their curriculum, it is unclear that the legal academy recognizes that 
the standard text material within the core curriculum often lacks sufficient 
acknowledgment of female contribution. Without such recognition, there 
is obviously no need to change. 
Recognition of the problem is a necessary first step. Next, there needs 
to be an overhaul, or at least serious scrutiny, of three major elements of 
the legal academy that have not been seriously challenged: what consti-
tutes legitimate legal scholarship, whether the teaching of Constitutional 
Law necessitates the integration of history and whether the case method, or 
at least case selection as it now exists in standard Constitutional texts, is 
adequate for an appropriate, evenhanded, presentation of Constitutional 
Law. 
In many respects, all three of these involve the textbooks themselves. 
If the norm and not the exception would be to include emphasis on 
women's achievement and more of what is regarded as nontraditional 
scholarship, then different materials would be incorporated into the text-
books. If, however, there is no demand by the legal institution for such a 
change, there would be no incentive for text editors to substantially change 
a tried and true product, nor would there be a demand by publishers for 
other authors to produce like materials. 
Admittedly, it is easier to add a paragraph about Bradwell than to re-
formulate an entire chapter. But reformulation and integration is vital. 
Otherwise, with Bradwell and Muller primarily in the notes, their emphasis 
will be left solely in the hands of the professor who mayor may not choose 
them to be integral to the course. If Minor is not included in the textbooks 
at all, its emphasis in the classroom is highly unlikely. If these cases re-
ceived "major" emphasis within most respected Constitutional Law texts, 
their emphasis in the classroom would not be subject to chance. 
The efforts of some current casebook authors,287 in this respect, should 
not be overlooked. In a new Constitutional Law text published by the An-
derson Publishing Company, the authors do not relegate Muller to a note 
case, but rather include it within mainstream discussion as it relates to 
Lochner and its successors.288 Following both Lochner and Muller is a 
discussion relating the two cases and how the cases fit in historically.289 
The "Brandeis Brief' is mentioned,290 but Muller is seemingly not mini-
287. Anderson Publishing Company has published a Constitutional Law text put together 
a little differently than other mainstream texts. Entitled "Cases, History, and Dialogues" 
rather than "Cases and Materials." LIVELY ET AL., supra note 136. The book has two fe-
male and two male authors. The presentation of cases is more historically integrated with 
discussion about why certain decisions were reached. 
288. Id. at 31. 
289. Id. at 32-33. 
290. /d. at 31. 
-
em 
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mized or isolated as only a "woman's" case. 291 In addition, the authors of 
the text make reference to both a male and female Constitutional Law 
scholar in their discussion preceding their segment on Substantive Due 
Process?92 It should not be surprising to find that two of the four textbook 
authors are female. 293 
Part of the efficacy of the Anderson text is the explanation and 
"Dialogue" between the cases that give a context for understanding each 
case. Whether by design or not, most Constitutional Law texts neither 
proceed chronologically nor by any set order of Constitutional Law prin-
ciples. While this is not necessarily a problem in and of itself, the total 
abstraction from historical context, without textual clarification, once 
again enables a professor to leave out what is believed to be insignificant. 
Since women were not generally involved in creating a traditional source 
of law, it is logical to assume that their mention would only be included 
within an integration of historical explanation. 
Barring some sort of woman recognition mandate, there are admittedly 
no surefire solutions to the non-recognition problem. Most certainly there 
needs to be both acknowledgment and leadership. The leadership could 
come through the American Association of Law Schools or the American 
Bar Association by way of establishing a committee to look into the situa-
tion and make institutional recommendations (such as with the MacCrate 
Report).294 It could also come from professors of Constitutional Law and 
American Legal History who could (and perhaps have) design(ed) a more 
evenly represented curriculum. It could come from respected Constitu-
tional Law scholars and authors who might revise some of the more widely 
used texts. It could also come from the legal publishers themselves who 
would take more of a chance on publishing and publicizing textbooks that 
are constructed innovatively. Ideally, all of these might occur concur-
rently. 
CONCLUSION 
One would hope that everyone in the legal profession acknowledges 
the marginalization of female achievements made during the formation of 
our country. Few men today would regard all women as too delicate for 
291. [d. 
292. See id. at 26 (i.e., Suzanna Sherry and Daniel Farber). 
293. There is now another Constitutional Law textbook co-authored by a female. The 
Thirteenth Edition of Constitutional Law by Gerald Gunther is now co-authored by Kath-
leen M. Sullivan. See GUNTHER ET AL., supra note 136. 
294. ABA Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Profes-
sional Development-An Educational Continuum (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992). The Mac-
Crate Report is the end result of a study of law school curriculum commissioned by the 
American Bar Association. The report ultimately concluded that law schools should offer 
more skills-based courses. 
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rigorous mental work or suggest that males, as a class, are more intelligent 
than females. In many respects, we are left with this history and must 
work with it, perhaps not expecting too much too soon. 
While the efforts of many professors and law schools295 should not be 
slighted, those efforts must extend considerably further. Women have al-
ready earned their place within the establishment of our legal jurispruden-
tial society. They have been integral to the development of our Constitu-
tional framework and should be acknowledged as such. With the legal 
profession nearing the point of being half populated by women,296 it is im-
portant that legal education provide exposure to historical female role 
models rather than perpetuate the mistaken belief that anything accom-
plished will be trivialized or will be done only against overcoming the 
overwhelming odds of breaking into the male-dominated hierarchy of the 
law.297 Legal education must also provide exposure to the historical record 
of female accomplishment and set in place curricular structures to prevent 
future marginalization. 
There is an additional consideration. Throughout the course of Ameri-
can legal history, the male-dominated power structure has systematically 
excluded females from positions of power.298 Now that some females have 
achieved power, they are still relegated to being on the outside looking in. 
Female legal educators must teach about a system from which they have 
been historically ostracized and one that fails to acknowledge that 
women's influence has been significant within the development of the 
law.299 
The law has often been used to perpetuate injustice rather than rectify 
it. As educators of those who will create and enforce future laws that 
ideally will neither perpetuate discrimination nor the marginalization of 
achievements, law schools must play an important part. Law schools are 
the creators of leaders and should be at the forefront of progressive action. 
Jane Addams commented, "Old-fashioned ways which no longer apply to 
changed conditions are a snare in which the feet of women have always 
295. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison et aI., Succeeding in Law School: A Comparison of 
Women's Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania, 3 MICH. 
J. GENDER & L. 515 (1996). 
296. For statistics, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION, A 
Review of Legal Education in the United States 67 (1996). 
297. See Farley, supra note 254, n.89. 
298. In commenting upon the protectionist philosophy of the legal system that did not 
even moderately shift gears until the 1970s, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has stated, ''To 
tum in a new direction, the Court first had to comprehend that legislation apparently de-
signed to benefit or protect women could often, perversely, have the opposite effect." Gins-
burg, supra note 62, at 20. 
299. For a discussion of additional "flaws" of the legal education system, see DUNCAN 
KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HEIRARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST 
THE SYSTEM 119-23 (1983). 
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become readily entangled.,,30o This should be an assessment that no longer 
holds true for legal education. Legal educators must rethink their roles in 
reflecting the reality of the times and remedying the shortsightedness of 
their predecessors who would not rise above the societal prejudices of their 
time?OI While a new generation need not be vilified for a shortsighted 
past, it has the power to rectify some injustice by acknowledging both the 
reality and validity of feminine influences in shaping legal theory in our 
country. 
300. THE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, supra note 70, at 210. 
301. The portraits on the walls of many respected legal institutions are primarily of men 
although it was many of those very men who allowed the exclusion of women from within 
their ranks. See, e.g., Brett S. Martin, Students Protest Hall of "Dead White Males," NAT'L 
JURIST, May/June 1997, at 11. 
